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The decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in King v King demonstrates that in 
proceedings in Queensland Courts legal practitioners acting pro bono should still 
consider at the outset whether it is desired to provide for recovery of costs which 
might be recovered from another party. 
Pro bono – but what about costs? 
 
Even when acting pro bono, the possible recovery of costs needs to be considered at the outset. 
 
Costs – successful applicant’s lawyers acting pro bono – variation of costs agreement 
shortly before judgment – new agreement provided for recovery of costs – whether costs 
should be awarded to applicant. 
 
In King v King [2012] QCA 81 the Queensland Court of Appeal declined to award costs to a 
successful applicant whose lawyers acted on a pro bono basis. 
Facts 
The application for leave to appeal in the matter was argued on 21 February 2012. No 
submissions were addressed to the court on the question of costs, but as it was apparent 
that the applicant’s lawyers were acting for him pro bono, the court did not make an order 
for costs when judgment was given on 6 March 2012. 
After judgment was handed down, the applicant’s lawyers asked for costs. Leave was given 
to file written submissions in support of the application. The affidavit accompanying the 
submissions made for the applicant annexed a copy of the costs agreement between the 
applicant and his solicitors, and a written variation to that agreement. 
The costs agreement was made on 13 October 2011 and was titled ‘(Pro Bono)’. The 
agreement set out the nature of the work to be undertaken for the applicant and then 
provided: 
4. Charges 
4.1 Estimate of charges 
We have agreed that there will be no charges in relation to the matter … 
4.2 Basis on which our charges are calculated 
We have agreed that we will not charge you for the work. 
 
The variation to the costs agreement was made at 9.15am on 6 March 2012, about 15 
minutes before the judgment was delivered. The variation added the following clause: 
 
4.3 Legal costs recovered from another party 
4.3.1 If you are successful in your matter, the court may order … that the other party 
or parties pay certain legal fees and expenses. 
4.3.1. In those circumstances, we may charge you for the legal fees and the expenses 
we have incurred on your behalf to an amount no greater than the amount of legal 
fees and expenses recovered from the other party … pursuant to such court order …” 
 
When agreeing to the variation, the applicant confirmed that it would apply retrospectively 
to all work to be done under the agreement. 
 
Submission 
 
It was submitted for the applicant that the costs agreement as varied made him 
contingently liable to pay costs to his solicitors if the court ordered the respondents to pay 
him his costs of the application. It was submitted further that the court should make the 
costs order so as to satisfy the contingency and that this would give rise to a liability for the 
applicant to pay his solicitors. This would then provide the basis for the court ordering costs 
to indemnify the applicant against the liability he would incur to his solicitors on the making 
of the order. 
 
Analysis 
 
The lead judgment in the Court of Appeal was delivered by Chesterman JA. His Honour 
noted (at [6]) that an order for costs operates as an indemnity to a successful party in 
litigation, and that costs are awarded to recompense a successful party for the cost of 
bringing or defending proceedings. A corollary of this is that the unsuccessful litigant is not 
required to pay any more than the costs incurred by the successful opponent: Oshlack v 
Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72. 
 
His Honour also noted that the right to indemnity cannot arise unless the successful litigant 
is under a legal liability to pay costs, so that if a successful litigant’s lawyers act without 
charge, there is no entitlement to an order for costs as there is nothing to indemnify the 
successful litigant against: McCullum v Ifield [1969] 2 NSWLR 329 at 330, cited by Santow JA 
in Wentworth v Rogers (2006) 66 NSWLR 474 at 486. 
  
Chesterman JA then discussed in some detail the decision in Wentworth v Rogers, in which 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered a costs agreement to the same effect as 
that before the court here. As his Honour noted, Basten JA and Santow JA expressed 
different views in that case as to whether the agreement gave rise to a liability against 
which the applicant was entitled to an indemnity by way of a costs order, though the 
determination of that point was not critical to the result. The third member of the court, 
Hislop J, did not express an opinion on the point. 
 
Basten JA had discussed most fully the nature of the contingencies which might arise in 
costs agreements and their consequences on the need for an indemnity, by way of a costs 
order against that liability. His Honour had observed that it was in accordance with current 
notions of public interest that a lawyer might act for a meritorious client who it was known 
could not pay professional costs if unsuccessful, and it would be surprising if such an 
arrangement could not allow for a costs order from which fees could be recovered if the 
client was successful. 
 
In his Honour’s view it was appropriate in such a case to formalise an arrangement by which 
the lawyer would accept a reduced fee, or waive the right to require payment, in the event 
that the proceedings were unsuccessful. In each case, there would be an immediate and 
quantifiable obligation imposed on the client when the retainer is created, with the 
contingency operating as a condition subsequent. 
 
An arrangement in this form was distinguished from the kinds of contractual arrangements 
in which the client has no obligation to pay professional costs unless and until an order is 
made by the court for the recovery of those costs in litigation, and also those where the 
right to recovery depends on the actual recovery of those costs. In the view of Basten JA the 
circularity in each case was readily apparent. Also, if the obligation to pay depended on the 
actual recovery of costs, there may be no extant legal obligation to be indemnified even 
when a costs order was made. Basten JA had concluded that it was not possible to make the 
existence of a right to charge dependent on recovery of moneys from which the charges 
would be paid. 
 
Santow JA had taken a different view. His Honour thought that a litigant came under a 
sufficient liability to the litigant’s solicitors to justify the court ordering the indemnity by 
way of costs against the unsuccessful litigant whether the contingency relating to the 
successful outcome of the matter was expressed as a condition precedent or as a condition 
subsequent. 
 
Chesterman JA preferred Basten JA’s analysis. His Honour concluded that the circularity 
noted by Basten J, and inherent in the submission for the applicant, showed that, when 
properly analysed, there was no obligation in the applicant to pay costs until a costs order 
was made, and a costs order could not be made until there was a liability in the successful 
litigant to pay their own lawyers’ costs. 
 
Chesterman JA was satisfied, however, that it was not necessary to determine the 
application for costs on this basis. His Honour regarded the variation to the costs agreement 
as artificial and of doubtful validity. He referred to a number of relevant factors, including: 
the singular point in time at which the agreement was made, the absence of consideration 
for the promise to accept a retrospective obligation (past consideration being valueless), 
and the failure to comply with the requirement in s308 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 
(Qld) to specify the basis of charging. 
 
Reference was also made to the discretion which the court retained in any event to not 
order costs against the respondents. Chesterman JA was persuaded this discretion should 
be exercised against the making of the order sought. Though acknowledging the agreement 
of the applicant’s solicitors to represent him gratis as “in the best traditions of the 
profession”, his Honour said (at [15]): 
 
“ … the amendment appears a contrivance to alter the nature of his representation ex post 
facto, and with it the basis on which the respondents had understood the applicant was 
represented, and the application was fought. There would be an element of unfairness to 
the respondents if effect was given retrospectively to the change.” 
 
Chesterman JA concluded the order made when judgment was pronounced – that there be 
no order for costs – should be reaffirmed. 
 
White JA agreed with the reasons of Chesterman JA and the order proposed. Margaret 
Wilson AJA agreed with the reasoning of Chesterman JA about the validity of the variation 
and the discretionary considerations. Her Honour declined to express any view about the 
circularity argument or the different views expressed by Santow and Basten JJA in 
Wentworth v Rogers (2006] 66 NSWLR 474. 
 
Comment 
 
The decision has significant implications for practitioners who act on a pro bono basis. It 
demonstrates the importance in litigious matters of considering at the outset whether it is 
desired to provide for recovery of costs which might be recovered from another party. 
Clearly costs agreements in such cases must take a different form from pro bono 
agreements to act in non-litigious matters where there is no expectation of recovery of 
professional costs, or professional costs and disbursements. 
 
In light of the majority view in this case, it is prudent – when seeking to recover costs which 
might be recovered from another party – to prepare the costs agreement in a form in which 
the waiver of the fee may fairly be regarded as a condition subsequent. 
